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Abstract. Privacy-preserving reversible watermarking, as a subfield of
secure signal processing, has received a growing research attention in the
recent years due to privacy concerns in cloud computing. In this paper,
we propose a novel reversible watermarking scheme for data exfiltration
prevention. This scheme enables the cloud to embed labels that indi-
cate the degree of confidentiality into the encrypted documents in such
a way that the network administrator can monitor the document exfil-
tration through detecting the labels in the encrypted domain without
compromising data privacy. An efficient watermarking algorithm is de-
vised primarily based upon the concept of lexicographic permutations.
In addition to this, a content-adaptive signal estimation mechanism is
constructed for assisting host media recovery. Experimental results show
that the proposed scheme outperforms the state-of-the-art with regards
to watermarking capacity, fidelity, and recoverability.
Keywords: Cloud computing · Data exfiltration · Multimedia security
· Privacy protection · Reversible watermarking · Stream cipher.
1 Introduction
Due to the advances in cloud computing technology, businesses and individuals
have entrusted an increasing amount of data to the cloud for the purposes of
processing and storage. In the meantime, there has been an increasing need for
privacy protection. Although encryption is a widely used tool for protecting data
against information leakage, conventional signal processing techniques become
invalid in the encrypted domain. Towards addressing this problem, Rivest et
al. introduced the concept of privacy homomorphisms [11], which opened up
possibilities for performing computations upon encrypted data. As a challenging
problem under this research field, privacy-preserving reversible watermarking
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was primarily motivated by the fact that many watermarking algorithms are
proprietary properties and thus any unauthorised use with commercial purposes
may be considered as violation of copyrights. While one may entrust the task
of watermarking to a licensed cloud service provider, privacy risks should be
taken into account [1, 5, 10, 18]. From a theoretical point of view, the cloud is
assumed to be an honest-but-curious or semi-honest party that is interested
in learning the information from the protocol (e.g. the plaintext), but does not
deviate from the protocol specification. This research problem is challenging since
an imperceptible alteration in the ciphertext domain may cause a nontrivial
distortion in the plaintext domain. If a cryptosystem is perfectly secure, it is
theoretically not possible to foresee how a change in the ciphertext domain would
result in a change in the plaintext domain.
The recent development of privacy-preserving watermarking schemes was
primarily based upon homomorphic cryptosystems [2, 6, 12, 13, 16]. Despite a
variety of mathematical operations permitted by homomorphic encryption, it is
a resource-intensive task to implement the system due to high computational
complexity and non-trivial ciphertext expansion. When taking the practicality
into consideration, it is advisable to build watermarking schemes based upon
conventional symmetric-key cryptosystems [4,8,9,14,17]. There are a variety of
possible applications of privacy-preserving reversible watermarking. Consider a
network administrator whose responsibility is to monitor data transmissions. It
is of crucial importance to prevent classified documents from leakage beyond this
point, and yet the authority to read the documents may not be granted to the
administrator. To address this issue, we may embed a label that indicates the
confidentiality of a given document as the watermark and design an algorithm
that is able to detect the watermark without decrypting the file.
In this paper, we propose a novel reversible watermarking scheme compati-
ble with a semantically secure symmetric-key cryptosystem. An overview of the
proposed scheme is as follows: the encoding process utilises lexicographic per-
mutations to embed watermarks into encrypted signals, whereas the decoding
process extracts the watermarks and recovers the signals in aid of a content-
adaptive signal estimation mechanism. Experimental results show a significant
breakthrough over the state-of-the-art in watermarking capacity, fidelity and
recoverability. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
presents the proposed watermarking scheme and signal estimation mechanism.
Section 3 evaluates the scheme performance in comparison with the state-of-the-
art. Section 4 concludes our work and outlines the directions for future research.
2 Proposed Scheme
An overview of the proposed scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1. To begin with,
we introduce a privacy-preserving reversible watermarking scheme based upon
lexicographic permutations and then present an updated scheme with detailed
discussions. In addition to this, a content-adaptive signal estimation mechanism
is constructed in order to realise the scheme in practice.
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Fig. 1: An overview of the proposed scheme. The transmitter encrypts a host
array of symbols s with a key k and then uploads the encrypted array e to the
cloud. A watermark w is encoded into e producing a marked array εw, which is
then sent to a network administrator for inspection. Depending on the decoded
w, the transmission will either continue to move on or stop at this point. If the
data is transmittable, at the receiving end, a permutation group containing the
original encrypted array, denoted by {εi}ti=0, is generated. After decryption, a
group containing the original array, denoted by {σi}ti=0, is yielded. Eventually,
the original array is restored with assistance of additional information, denoted
by s̃, obtained from a signal estimation mechanism.
2.1 A Permutation-Based Scheme
Consider the host signal as an 8-bit greyscale image. In order to satisfy the
fidelity requirement, significant bit-planes should not be modified during water-
mark embedding process. To pave the way for presentation, we specify that the
four most significant bit-planes are unmodifiable, though the scheme permits
variations in implementation depending on different fidelity assessment models.
Let us refer to the remaining four insignificant bit-planes as a nybble-plane,
where the basic unit is a nybble, namely, a four-bit aggregation. While this
nybble-plane is generally modifiable, only a portion of the nybbles are selected
for carrying the payload and the rest part is kept intact for the purpose of re-
versing watermarking distortions. The selection follows a rule that each selected
nybble is encircled by eight unselected immediate neighbours. The unselected
nybbles will remain intact and be exploited for estimating the selected nybbles
during the reverse process. A nybble can be represented by an integer between
0 and 15. Let a sequence of r modifiable nybbles be converted into an integer,
referred to as a host symbol, between 0 and N − 1, where N = 24r.
Let us divide the host symbols into non-overlapping arrays of length n and
each array can be processed independently. Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be an array
of modifiable host symbols and k = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) be an array of randomly
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generated key symbols. The transmitter encrypts the former with the latter by
e ≡ s + k (mod N). (1)
Note that the array arithmetic operations are carried out element by element.
Then, the transmitter uploads the enciphered array e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) along
with the watermark w to the cloud, in which the watermark encoding is realised
through lexicographic permutations. Before proceeding further, let us define the
number of permutations of a given set. If the set of size n consists of n distinct
elements, the number of permutations is simply the factorial of n, denoted by
n!. If the set consists of repeated elements, then the multiplicity of each element
shall be taken into account. Let M be a multiset of size n consisting of l distinct
elements and the multiplicities of the elements be m1, m2, . . . , ml. The number
of permutations of M is then given by
t =
n!
m1!m2! . . .ml!
. (2)
Let Gε = {ε0,ε1, . . . ,εt−1} be a group consisting of all the possible permuta-
tions of e sorted with lexicographic order, where εu = e and 0 ≤ u ≤ t − 1. A
possible watermarking strategy is to encode a payload of log2 t bits into one of
the possible permutations. For instance, if an encrypted array e and a message
0 ≤ w ≤ t−1 are encoded into εw, during the decoding process we can efficiently
determine w as the lexicographic order of εw. Note that the watermark extrac-
tion process is carried out in the encrypted domain. As a result, the network
administrator can inspect the decoded watermark to decide whether the host
file has been given approval to be transmit beyond this point without actually
inspecting the file itself. In other words, this scheme prevents data exfiltration
without compromising data privacy. Apart from knowing the watermark infor-
mation, we can also be certain about that e is one of the possible permutations
of εw, though we are not able to recognise which it is in the absence of fur-
ther information. At the receiving end, one may want to remove the distortions
caused by watermarking. Since it is theoretically not possible to make inferences
from the encrypted data, we decipher each possible one by
σi ≡ εi − k (mod N), (3)
and obtain Gσ = {σ0,σ1, . . . ,σt−1}. As a result, we can employ signal pro-
cessing techniques to analyse each σi and draw an inference on the original one
in which some distinguishable structures may inhere. However, failed inferences
may occur with high probability when we happen to process a sequence of intrin-
sically similar host symbols and a sequence of intrinsically similar key symbols.
For example, consider s = (s1, s2) and k = (k1, k2) such that s1 ≈ s2 and
k1 ≈ k2. We encrypt s into e and then encode e into either ε0 or ε1 depending
on whether w = 0 or w = 1. Assume that e is of the 0-th permutation order,
namely, ε0 = e, and accordingly
ε0 = (e1, e2) = (s1 + k1, s2 + k2),
ε1 = (e2, e1) = (s2 + k2, s1 + k1).
(4)
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In order to recover the original permutation, we decrypt respectively ε0 and ε1
into σ0 and σ1, as given by
σ0 = ε0 − k = (s1, s2),
σ1 = ε1 − k = (s2 + k2 − k1, s1 + k1 − k2).
(5)
If s1 ≈ s2 and k1 ≈ k2, then σ0 ≈ σ1. We can observe that in this case σ0 is
indistinguishable from σ1.
2.2 An Updated Scheme
In the previous scheme, we permute e lexicographically and obtain a lexicon, or a
codebook, for watermark encoding. To overcome the ambiguity in some extreme
cases, we update the previous scheme by introducing an invertible transform to
e prior to the creation of the lexicon. Let φ(N) be Euler’s totient function which
describes the number of positive integers up to N that relatively prime to N . A
positive integer that is coprime to N is termed a totative of N . Suppose that e
is the u-th permutation. We multiply e with the u-th totative, denoted by pu,
and obtain
e′ ≡ e · pu (mod N). (6)
An important property of the above computation is that an inverse transform
exists, which is given by
e ≡ e′ · qu (mod N), (7)
where qu is a unique modular multiplicative inverse of pu with respect to the
modulus N , that is,
pu · qu ≡ 1 (mod N). (8)
A unique modular multiplicative inverse qu exists if and only if pu is coprime
to N , that is, gcd(pu, N) = 1, where gcd stands for greatest common divisor.
The number of permutations of e′ is also t since the transform from e to e′ is a
bijective mapping.
We sort the permutations of e′ lexicographically and form an ordered lexicon
Gε = {ε0,ε1, . . . ,εt−1} and encode a watermark w of log2 t bits into one of
the permutations yielding the marked result εw. In the decoding phase, w can
be efficiently recognised by the order of εw. Let {p0, p1 . . . , pt−1} be the first t
totatives in [0, N ], and {q1, . . . , qt} be their respective modular multiplicative
inverses. To restore the original array, we choose any εi from the lexicon and
multiply it with each multiplicative inverse yielding Gα = {α0,α1, . . . ,αt−1},
where
α0 ≡ εi · q0 (mod N),
α1 ≡ εi · q1 (mod N),
· · ·
αt−1 ≡ εi · qt−1 (mod N).
(9)
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Then, we sort the elements in each array with the lexicographic order in accor-
dance to the array index and yield an updated group of arrays Gβ = {β0, β1,
. . . , βt−1}. For instance, the elements in αi is sorted with the i-th lexicographic
order yielding βi. Note that the choice of εi does not affect the resultant Gβ;
in other words, any εi yields the same group of results. The u-th array in Gα
is the original encrypted array with scrambled elements, whereas the u-th array
in Gβ is exactly the original encrypted array, namely βu = e. Since it is not
possible to distinguish the original array in the encrypted domain, we decipher
each array in Gβ and obtain Gσ = {σ0,σ1, . . . ,σt−1}. With the aid of signal
analysis techniques, we can retrieve the original one, namely σu, with relatively
low error rate. Let us see how this updated scheme is able to resolve the afore-
mentioned ambiguity. Again, consider two host symbols and two key symbols
such that s1 ≈ s2 and k1 ≈ k2. Assume that e is of the 0-th permutation order
and accordingly e′ = e · p0. Then, we encode e′ into either ε0 or ε1 depend-
ing on the watermark bit. In the recovering phase, two possible candidates are
generated by
σ0 = β0 − k = sort(α0, 0)− k = sort(εi · q0, 0)− k,
σ1 = β1 − k = sort(α1, 1)− k = sort(εi · q1, 1)− k,
(10)
where sort(x, i) denote a sorting function that sorts the elements of an array x
according to the i-th lexicographic permutation, and εi can be either ε0 or ε1.
We further derive that
sort(εi · q0, 0)− k = ((s1 + k1)p0q0 − k1, (s2 + k2) · p0q0 − k2) = (s1, s2), (11)
and σ1 equals to either
sort(εi · q1, 1)− k = ((s1 + k1)p0q1 − k1, (s2 + k2) · p0q1 − k2), (12)
or
sort(εi · q1, 1)− k = ((s2 + k2)p0q1 − k1, (s1 + k1) · p0q1 − k2). (13)
In either case, two candidates are not likely to be similar since the term puqv,
where u 6= v, thoroughly randomise the incorrect candidate; in other words, the
original array should be very distinguishable from a sequence of random numbers
with high probability.
2.3 A Content-Adaptive Estimator
To complete the proposed scheme, we devise a signal estimation mechanism for
assisting host signal recovery. As aforementioned, for an 8-bit greyscale image
we embed payloads into selected low nybbles while each of which is encircled by
eight unselected immediate neighbours, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The aim is to
estimate the low nybble of a pixel p0 with the aid of the high nybble of p0 and
the neighbouring pixels p1, p2, . . . , p8. Image regions can be roughly divided into
smooth patches, edges and complex textures. Due to the fact that the statistical


























































































































Fig. 2: Pixels at the black positions are modifiable in terms of their low nybbles,
whereas those at the white positions are unmodifiable.
distribution of pixel values varies a lot in different regions, we have to identify






|xi − µ(X)| (14)
represents the mean absolute deviation (MAD), where µ(X) represents the arith-
metic mean and γ represents the number of elements in a given set X. The score
for smooth patches is given by
δsmth = M(p1, p2, . . . , p8), (15)
and the scores for different degrees of edges are given by
δ0◦ =
















Let the minimum value of {δsmth, δ0◦ , δ45◦ , δ90◦ , δ135◦} be denoted by δmin. If
δmin is no greater than a threshold θ (empirically θ = 15), then we calculate an
anticipated value for p0 by
p̃0 =

µ(p1, p2, . . . , p8) if δmin = δsmth,
µ(p4, p5) if δmin = δ0◦ ,
µ(p3, p6) if δmin = δ45◦ ,
µ(p2, p7) if δmin = δ90◦ ,
µ(p1, p8) if δmin = δ135◦ .
(17)
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Otherwise, an anticipated value for p0 is determined by the closest value in the
neighbouring area, that is,
p̃0 = arg min
pi
| pi − p0 |, (18)
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}. Finally, we estimate p0’s low nybble in such a way that
the resultant pixel value approeaches the anticipated value p̃0, as formulated by
p̃∗0 = arg min
p0,j
| p0,j − p̃0 |, (19)
where j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15} and p0,j denotes a value generated by setting p0’s low
nybble to one of the possible patterns.
3 Experiments
In the experiments, greyscale images of size 512×512 with 256 tonal options are
used as the host media, as shown in Fig. 3. The scheme utilises a synchronous
stream cipher to encrypt images and is therefore semantically secure. Let the
number of host symbols in each array be fixed to n = 4. Each symbol is formed
by r modifiable nybbles, where r is set to 2, and correspondingly the symbol
values lie in the range from 0 to 255. We compare the proposed scheme with
the state-of-the-art schemes [3, 7, 15] in terms of the fidelity and recoverability.
Let pi,j denote the pixel at the i-th row and the j-th column, and p̂i,j denote
its noisy counterpart. We evaluate the image quality by peak signal-to-noise
ratio (PSNR). As can be seen from Fig. 4, the proposed scheme outperforms
the previous methods with regard to the fidelity of marked images under the
same embedding rate. As reported in Fig. 5, the proposed scheme also achieves
the best results with respect to the fidelity of recovered images given the same
amount of payload. Overall, it is evident that the proposed scheme achieves a
substantial improvement in algorithm performance.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, a novel reversible watermarking scheme is proposed to embed pay-
load into encrypted images via lexicographic permutations. The scheme is com-
patible with a synchronous stream cipher and is therefore semantically secure.
We derive further an updated version of the scheme in order to minimise the er-
ror rate in host recovery. In addition to this, a content-adaptive signal estimation
mechanism is devised for supporting the recovery process. Experimental results
show a remarkable breakthrough over the state-of-the-art in capacity, fidelity,
and recoverability. It is expected that the research in this field will continue to
move forwards in the future, and from our perspective, further minimisation of
error rate in host recovery entails further investigation.
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(a) Airplane (b) Lena
Fig. 3: Test images.
















































Fig. 4: Fidelity comparisons. The horizontal axis displays the watermarking ca-
pacity, whereas the vertical axis shows the PSNR of marked images.




















































Fig. 5: Recoverability comparisons. The horizontal axis depicts the watermarking
capacity, whereas the vertical axis presents the PSNR of recovered images.
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